Why do some governments adopt unpopular reforms entailing far-reaching liberalization of the labour market, while others opt only for marginal adjustments or supports the argument that the effect of political constraints and opportunities on the choice of reforms is shaped by partisan differences.
the last two decades. While the former focuses on explaining the occurrence of reform in general, the latter is concerned primarily with the direction of reforms.
This paper presents a model that explains the likelihood of different types of reform as an effect of different constellations of government partisanship and veto players.
Two general assumptions underpin this model. The first is the standard assumption that politicians want to stay in power or secure electoral gains. The second assumption is that the deteriorating economic circumstances over the last two decades have made both left and right parties in Europe increasingly inclined to perceive labour market liberalization as a potential solution to the underlying economic problems.
1 If these assumptions are correct, left and right parties should respond differently to constraints and opportunities offered by veto players. Overall, the 'blame avoidance' logic should be particularly relevant for left parties in power, The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets the stage for the subsequent analysis by providing a brief summary of reform activity in Europe since 1990.
Seeking to explain variation in reform outcomes, section 2 proposes a synthesis of the veto players and partisanship models and outlines the central argument in more detail. Section 3 discusses the data and methods used to test the outlined predictions.
Section 4 presents a discussion of empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
A brief summary of reform activity in Europe, 1990-2007
European countries have witnessed substantial reform activity in the area of employment protection over the past two decades. To address sluggish labour markets and respond to the increasing competitive pressures, many of these reforms have sought to increase flexibility and relax the rules that govern hiring and firing
practices. Yet, despite the popular view that most, if not all, reforms during this period have been of liberal character, data show that regulatory reforms have been almost equally likely. During 1990 During -2007 there has been a total of exactly 200 EPL reforms in Europe. 2 Only 105 of those have been liberal, while the rest have been regulatory. While a large portion of regulatory reforms are to be attributed to the adoption of EU legislative directives that pertain to issues such as fixed-term contracts, temporary work agencies and collective dismissals, a considerable number of regulatory reforms was driven entirely by domestic factors. In some cases, these reforms implied new regulation, in others a reversal of previous liberalization.
Regardless of the direction, however, the majority of EPL reforms have been marginal in the sense that they did not entail major changes for regular, full-time employees. This confirms previous findings of studies concerned with reforms of employment protection in Western Europe (see Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000) .
The overwhelming proportion of marginal reforms may reflect a high degree of risk aversion on the part of politicians or the power of different veto blocks. Yet, contrary to the view that regardless of whether far-reaching reforms are attempted, the result is primarily marginal adjustments (Saint-Paul, 1996) , table 1 shows that almost a fifth of reforms were of structural character, implying significant changes in employment protection that affect all or a majority of employees.
[ Table 1 about here]
As evident, while the number of regulatory and liberal reforms of marginal scope is similar, liberalization is clearly dominant among structural reforms. Nonetheless, almost a third of structural reforms have been regulatory, which further underlines the need to understand not only the conditions under which reforms are possible, but also the conditions for different types of EPL reform.
Veto players and political partisans in labour market reforms
What explains the likelihood of different types of employment protection reforms?
Two strands of literature provide relevant clues. The first strand emphasizes the role of veto players. These studies usually refer to the structure of the political system and argue that a high number of institutional (and in some cases partisan) veto players is an impediment to reforms (Immergut, 1992; Huber, Ragin and Stephens, 1993; Kittel and Obinger, 2003) . A more complex version of this argument emphasizes the need not only to count the number of potential veto players, but also to examine empirically their specific policy preferences (Tsebelis, 2002 ; see also Hallerberg and Basinger, 1998; Braeuninger, 2003) . These differences notwithstanding, common to these arguments is the general idea that the higher the number of veto players, the lower the likelihood of reforms. A number of welfare state scholars, however, have turned this argument on its head and maintain that a high number of veto players may actually facilitate reforms. The premise here is that in the era of 'permanent fiscal austerity' all parties are under pressure to cut entitlements. The contemporary politics of reforms, so this argument goes, is the 'politics of blame avoidance' (Pierson, 2001; Bonoli, 2001) . Since a high number of veto players makes it difficult to attribute easily the blame for liberal reforms to any single political party, reforms should be more likely in contexts dominated by many veto players. The second strand of scholarship emphasizes the role of government partisanship. The general argument here is that left parties are interested in protecting their core constituencies from labor market risks, and are therefore likely to expand, or at least oppose cuts of social protection. Along the same line of reasoning, right parties, whose core supporters are less exposed to labor market risks, are more likely to adopt liberal reforms (Korpi and Palme, 2003; Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Amable, Gatti and Schumacher, 2006) .
Taken separately, however, these two strands of literature do not offer a complete answer to the question of determinants of different types of employment protection reforms. The standard version of the veto player argument allows us to examine the occurrence of reforms, but it does not have much to say about the direction that a particular reform is likely to take. Its direct opponent -the blame avoidance argument -suffers from a similar flaw in that it allows us to examine the occurrence of only one type of reforms, namely liberal reforms. While the argument that all contemporary reforms are essentially retrenchment reforms may hold for some policy areas (such as pensions), this is clearly not the case with employment protection reforms, as shown above. Partisanship arguments, on the other hand, give clear predictions about the direction of reforms, but have little to say about the general conditions that make reforms more or less likely. To the extent that they consider political constraints (most often the constitutional structure) these are commonly entered into models as a control, and are rarely found to be significant (see Allan and Scruggs, 2004) . 3 An additional problem is that, apart from the blame avoidance arguments, partisanship and veto player approaches tend to consider policy preferences largely in isolation of parties' electoral strategies.
This paper argues that these strands of scholarship need to be combined to understand the politics of employment protection reforms in Europe during the last two decades. While political parties try to cater to their traditional constituencies, in times of economic difficulties both left and right parties may be inclined to liberalize employment protection. 4 I maintain that the goal they decide to pursue in a particular instance depends on the number of veto players. A high number of veto players presents different opportunities and constraints for left and right parties in government. Left parties are likely to see this as an opportunity for blame avoidance, which enables them to undertake liberalizing reforms while not being held directly accountable for such reforms by their core constituencies. A similar situation, however, is likely to lead to a different outcome when right parties are in office.
Their attempts to pass liberal reforms are likely to be blocked by left parties in the opposition who try to secure future electoral gains by defending employment protection. The likely outcome in this scenario should be either the status quo or a marginal regulatory reform. The latter may seem surprising given that the Right is not usually associated with regulatory reforms. However, the area of employment protection is peculiar in that all EU member states are subject to EU legislative directives that are generally of a regulative character, albeit marginal. While being in the opposition, the Right has nothing to lose from trying to block the domestic adoption of such EU-induced reforms. This strategy would likely meet the preferences of its core constituencies and it is unlikely to be at the receiving end of infringement procedures that the European Commission might start in reaction to such a breach of EU law. While obviously EU legislation has to be passed sooner or later, parties of the Right will want to appeal to their core constituencies and try to delay its domestic adoption when they are in the opposition. But when in office, these parties will have an incentive to adopt this legislation so to avoid potential penalties from the EU, and to simultaneously try to appeal to the pool of undecided voters who may favor higher employment protection. In the case of marginal regulation proposed by the Right, a high number of veto players is not an impediment to reform, since the Left is unlikely to oppose these measures.
The context with few veto players should generate different outcomes.
Because a low number of veto players makes it easier to attribute either blame or credit to governing parties, left parties will try to cater to their traditional voters and respond to their calls for more protection by adopting regulatory reforms, unless the economic conditions are dire, in which case they should prefer the status quo. In contrast, parties of the Right will see this situation as an opportunity to pass liberal reforms which is in line with preferences of their core constituencies. Figure 1 provides a summary of these predictions.
[ Figure 1 about here]
The guiding proposition of this paper requires an important qualification. 
Data and Methods
To examine governments' propensity to carry out labor market reforms I employ The scope of reforms, on the other hand, indicates whether a reform is marginal or structural. The former typically affect particular segments of the labor force (such as fixed-term employees, women, youth, etc.), while the latter affect all employees and adjust the broader design of the existing systems, rather than their specific features.
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The fRDB-IZA database covers EPL reforms up to 2007. Data on reforms for ten EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe from 1990 to 2009 were collected following the same template. The data collection process entailed three steps. In the first step an inventory of reforms was assembled based on an extensive search of national legislation, secondary literature, newspaper sources and records published in the European Industrial Relations Observatory Online. To verify this information, the preliminary database was sent to teams of national experts who added any missing information and corrected factual mistakes. Finally, any inconsistencies between the originally collected data and experts' responses were checked against the sources provided by experts, and in some cases alternative experts were consulted to verify the correctness of the information. Since we can think of reforms as a set of possibilities that imply different degrees of labor market flexibility, the records on reforms were then coded on a 1-5 scale so as to capture the extent of employment protection liberalization. Given the classification of reforms, structural reforms that increase the flexibility of the labor market were assigned the highest score, while the lowest score (which implies negative liberalization) was given to the structural regulatory reforms. Marginal reforms were assigned scores 2 and 4, while the status quo is coded as 3. In order to account for differences in the influence that organized economic interests may have on EPL reform, two further institutional controls are included.
The first one is union density, i.e. net union membership as a proportion of the employed labor force, which serves as a proxy for union strength. Since employment protection is one of the key aims of trade unions, the standard expectation is that strong unions will resist EPL liberalization. The second control that captures the influence of organized interests is wage coordination. Inasmuch as coordinated wage setting is associated with a higher capacity to reach a consensus on labor market reforms, such arrangements may facilitate liberal reforms. Data on both union density and the index of wage coordination are taken from Visser (2009) .
Because the underlying premise is that economic problems usually serve as an impetus for reform proposals, the models include a set of economic controls that combine GDP growth, unemployment and trade openness. GDP growth is included because in economies that experience high growth governments should be generally less likely to embark on liberal reforms. Unemployment and trade openness are included in all models in both levels and first differences so to capture better the impact of these variables on government's propensity to reform. The effect of these variables, however, is indeterminate. While high and rising unemployment may increase governments' determination to liberalize employment protection, liberalization may be politically risky in an environment in which unemployment is putting an increasing pressure on the public budgets and unions may organize to defend their entitlements. Similarly, trade openness and its first difference, which capture the effects of globalization and the increasing competition of the world markets, may work both ways and either stimulate liberal reforms or strengthen demands for more protection (Garrett, 1998 The level of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity was included in the initial regressions to control for the level of development. In addition, an indicator of electoral cycle was used as a control since one might expect that governments may be more prone to opt for liberal reforms at the beginning of their term in office, and for regulatory reform at the end of their term. This indicator counts the number of months between the election and the reform, and was constructed on the basis of the election data collected by Armingeon et al. (2009) . Since neither the GDP PPP nor the measures of electoral cycle were statistically significant in any specifications, they were discarded from the final analysis.
Estimation Strategy.
Because the dependent variable consists of discrete ordinal numbers (1 to 5), an ordered probit model is used to estimate the likelihood of EPL reforms. 9 Given the panel nature of the data, ideally a fixed-effect model should be estimated to control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. Unfortunately, there is no readily available formulation of a fixed-effects ordered probit estimator. 10 One alternative would be to simply insert the individual country dummies, but the estimates may suffer from bias due to the so-called incidental parameters problem (Green and Hensher, 2010, pp. 268-74) . Another alternative would be to estimate a randomeffects ordered probit model. However, the assumptions of this model that countries are random draws from a population and that the country individual effects are uncorrelated with other covariates seems untenable. Thus, I estimate a pooled ordered probit model using a robust variance-covariance matrix clustered by country.
This strategy helps to reduce the potential problem of serial correlation as it allows the errors to be correlated across reforms within the same country while still requiring them to be independent across countries.
As a robustness check I also estimate an ordinary least squares pooled regression with the variance-covariance matrix clustered by country, and to control for unobserved heterogeneity a fixed effects linear model, an OLS model with panel corrected standard errors (OLS-PCSE), and the BUC ordinal logit. The latter stands for 'Blow-Up and Cluster', a new procedure, which replaces every observation by K-1 copies of itself and dichotomizes these copies at a different cutoff point. A conditional maximum likelihood logit is then estimated using the entire sample, and relying on standard errors clustered at the country level (Baetschmann, Staub and Winkelmann, 2011) . Although OLS incorporates a problematic assumption that the difference between the discrete rankings of reform types is the same, these linear models nonetheless serve as a useful check of the main results. The BUC estimator is used for the same reason. While this estimator is not ideal for the data at hand, because its dichotomization procedure entails a certain loss of information with respect to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, the fact that BUC aims to account for unobserved heterogeneity makes it worth exploring. If most estimators yield similar results regarding the key variables, namely the interaction between partisanship and the number of veto players, this should increase our confidence in the ordinal probit estimates. [ Table 2 about here]
Empirical results
As evident, the veto player model by itself does not seem to be a suitable framework for explaining the likelihood of employment protection reforms, irrespective of the measure of veto players used. As an additional check, I also estimated the veto players model by using the measure of political constraints (Polcon index) developed by Henisz (2010) , which also failed to reach statistical significance.
11 Models III and IV offer some support for the partisanship arguments, with the coefficients for cabinet shares of both Left and Right parties significant at the 10% level. Because marginal effects in probit models are a function of all other independent variables, the magnitude of these coefficients cannot be directly interpreted as in linear models. However, we can at least see that the coefficients for partisanship variables are signed as expected by the partisanship hypothesis: left governments seem to be associated with a lower likelihood of far-reaching liberal reforms (outcome 5 on the ordinal scale), while right governments are linked to a higher likelihood of such reforms. Also, in line with the findings of Allan and Scruggs (2004) , the control for the number of veto players is not significant in these models. Models V and VI augment the partisanship models by adding the interaction between government orientation and the number of veto players. In both versions of the model the interaction effects turn out to be significant at the 5% level, and both coefficients are correctly signed. In comparison to Models III and IV, these results suggest that the effect of government partisanship is estimated more precisely when the interactions with the number of veto players are included. As Table 2 shows, most measures of fit indicate that Models V and VI offer a better explanation for the data at hand.
Turning to the institutional and economic controls, the coefficients for three variables -the strictness of the existing employment legislation, GDP growth and union density -are also significant in all models. The positive coefficient on union density is somewhat surprising since strong unions are conventionally expected to try to block liberalization. This result, however, may be understood in light of the experience of some broad-based deals between the unions, government and employers that traded a reduction in employment protection for the core workers In a comparable scenario, the Left is likely to opt for a quite different strategy and try to cater to its core constituencies, as evident from the predicted probability for regulatory vs. liberal reforms (.27 vs. .16).
To [ Figure 2 about here]
Robustness checks.
A number of checks were performed to examine the robustness of these results. The first check entailed the use of different estimators. Table 4 [ Table 4 about here]
Additional robustness checks involved a number of changes in specifications.
To check the impact of the individual variables, I first estimated a parsimonious specification, which entails only the measures of partisanship, veto players and their interaction, and then added to this specification one by one all the other predictors.
The results remain unaffected. Taking out non-significant variables does not change the results. Because GDP and unemployment are often correlated (albeit not in this sample), the same models were also run by including only one of these variables each time. The results remain robust. Given that the focus is on reform adoption rather than the implementation of new legislation, all models include present rather than lagged values of the economic variables. Lagging the economic variables, however, makes little difference to the overall results. In addition, as mentioned previously, a measure of the electoral cycle and a proxy for the stage of development was also included. These variables were not significant in any specification and do not change the overall results. 13 Finally, a Jackknife procedure was used to examine the influence of particular countries on the coefficient estimates. These regressions yielded coefficients on the interaction terms that were always correctly signed and almost always significant at the 10% level or better. 14 The sign and significance of other variables also hold across the regressions with one exception: dropping France makes unemployment marginally significant.
Conclusion
While the need for reforms that increase the flexibility of labor markets has been more or less a constant part of the political discourse in Europe over the past two decades, the political reality has been a mixture of liberal and regulatory reforms, most of which have entailed primarily adjustments at the margin, rather than farreaching changes in rules governing employment relationships. By examining the role of veto players and government's political orientation, this paper has proposed a heuristic model that identifies the conditions that make particular types of reforms most likely. The empirical analysis presented in the paper supports the theoretical argument that the impact of veto players on reforms depends on government partisanship.
Surprisingly, studies examining labor market reforms have not paid much attention to the interaction between partisanship and veto players. The analysis presented here emphasizes the role of adverse economic conditions and is based on the assumption that both left and right parties may be increasingly inclined to liberalize employment protection. The argument, however, is not that partisan differences are no longer important. Instead, the central claim is that partisan politics continues to matter for labor market reforms, but not in the traditional sense in which left parties are always associated with an expansion and right parties with a reduction of welfare entitlements. Rather the claim here is that how partisanship matters for reform outcomes is conditioned by the impact of veto players. Parties will pursue preferences of their core constituencies inasmuch as the configuration of the political system allows it, and as long as these preferences do not clash with the immediate economic imperatives. Considering parties as strategic actors who care about both votes and policies helps to understand why labor market reforms often do not reflect the traditional partisan preferences of parties in power.
Finally, the findings presented here cast some doubt on the idea that strong unions necessarily constitute a major impediment to liberal employment protection reforms. The results of the analysis suggest that unions may accept liberalization as long as the brunt of reforms is primarily on the shoulders of outsiders. This is broadly in line with accounts that emphasize the dualization of labor markets (Rueda, 2007; Palier and Thelen, 2010) . Reforms at the margin are clearly easier to obtain than structural reforms, which affect unions' core constituencies. Yet even structural reforms are not impossible as long as they entail considerable compensatory measures in other areas of labor market policy, such as unemployment benefits. In this light, the fact that the likelihood of structural liberalization increases with union density should not be surprising since only strong unions may be capable of extracting such concessions. Weaker unions, on the other hand, are unlikely to have the capacity to secure a substantial quid pro quo, but may be an impediment to reforms inasmuch as their reactions increase uncertainty that undermines governments' determination to pursue far-reaching liberalization. 1 This assumption is in line with the literature that emphasizes a narrowing of differences between the Left and the Right in terms of social and economic welfare state policies (Pierson, 1996; Ross, 2000; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Kitschelt, 2004) . See Keman (2011) and Blyth, Hopkin and Pelizzo (2010) for more recent evidence documenting the general movement of social-democratic parties towards economic centrism on the basis of the Comparative Manifesto data. While this aggregate evidence clearly cannot capture preferences of individual parties and certain cross-country differences that exist between parties that belong to the same family, it supports the assumption that most parties increasingly favour liberalization. Korpi and Palme (2003) and Kittel and Obinger (2003) are exceptions in that they set out to explore more explicitly how the effect of partisanship may differ in systems that have a different constitutional structure and thus different constraints on government's policy making. Again, however, the focus is on institutional, rather than partisan veto players. 4 A number of recent studies support the general proposition about the increasing convergence among parties towards policies associated with labour market and welfare state liberalization. See footnote 1 above. Data on employment protection reforms used in this paper show that although on the whole right parties have undertaken more liberal reforms than left parties, a large proportion of reforms adopted by left governments is categorized as liberal (40%). The move towards labour market liberalization reflects the view advocated by mainstream economists and international organizations that institutional rigidities are responsible for weak employment performance. This view has gained prominence among policy makers, despite the more recent literature that finds little evidence that links labour market institutions to unemployment (see Baker et al., 2005; Baccaro and Rei, 2007) . seek union agreement in case of collective redundancies. Examples of marginal reform include a reduction (or an increase) in the maximum number of renewals of fixed-term contracts, a relaxation of the hiring and firing rules for the first-time entrants to the labour market, and a prohibition to fire pregnant women and employees close to the retirement age. It should be noted that the term 'marginal reform' does not imply that such reforms are not important, but rather that they affect the margin as opposed to the core of the labour markets. Indeed, such reforms can bring about major changes in the structure and functioning of labour markets, as established by the recent literature on labour market dualization (see Rueda, 2007; Emmenegger ,2009; Palier and Thelen, 2010) . 7 In cases where there was more than one reform in a given year, the following strategy was used:
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When one of the reforms is structural and the other(s) marginal, the score reflects the scope and the direction of the structural reform. When both reforms are marginal and go in the same direction, the score was either 2 or 4. In cases where both reforms are marginal, but go in a different direction, the score was based on the reform that is likely to affect a higher proportion of the workforce or have more substantive implications for the overall design of the system. No observation entailed two structural reforms in a single country-year.
